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We propose and test a new 4-factor asset pricing model, modifying the
method of estimating the momentum risk factor, based on the conclusions of
George and Hwang (2004). We proceed to compare the performance of our
model with those of Fama and French (1993, 1996) and Carhart (1997)’s. We
find that the authors’ 52-week high strategy achieves a positive, though statis-
tically insignificant return in 1980-2014, with severely divergent performances
in subperiods 1980-2000 (significantly positive) and 2001-2014 (significantly
negative). Overall, our model for portfolios built on momentum outperforms
the 3-factor model but falls short from Carhart (1997)’s. Subperiod analysis
shows results in line with the complete sample for 1980-2000, while both mo-
mentum models’ performance in subperiod 2001-2014 seems influenced by the
unanticipated momentum crash of 2009. We conclude that a momentum risk
factor should be included in a given asset pricing model, but evidence suggests
it should be based on Jegadeesh and Titman (1993).
Key Words: 52-week high; Momentum; Asset pricing models.
JEL Classification Numbers: G12, G14, G15.
1. INTRODUCTION
Several deviations to the Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) have been
documented in the literature during the last decades. Among these anoma-
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the most relevant, as the strategy provides significant abnormal returns,
is computed using public information, and persists in subsequent studies.
The implications are especially relevant for asset pricing models, since the
effect is not captured by the CAPM or by Fama and French (1993, 1996)’s
3-factor model, paving the way for the development of Carhart (1997)’s
4-factor model.
However, George and Hwang (2004) provide an important extension to
the momentum literature, by developing a strategy based on the nearness
of a stock’s price to its 52-week high which surpasses the performances
of previous momentum strategies. Studies applying the methodology to
different markets and geographies, such as Du (2008), Liu et al. (2011)
and Li and Yu (2012), generally confirm the strategy’s abnormal returns.
Based on these empirical findings, and as the 52-week high approach
consistently surpasses the relative strength strategy, we conjecture that it
must also be a superior basis on which to build a momentum risk factor. As
such, we develop and test a new 4-factor model, by building the momentum
risk factor according to George and Hwang (2004), instead of Jegadeesh and
Titman (1993). As to provide a benchmark against which to compare the
results, we also test the 3-factor and Carhart (1997) models for the same
data. The tests follow the approach of Fama and French (2012), comprising
of time-series regressions on the excess returns of portfolios sorted on size-
BE/ME and size-momentum, from 1980 to 2014, in the US market.
To the best of our knowledge, there is no previous suggestion of such a
model in the literature. Even though the model lacks a strong theoretical
basis, if successful it would not only add to the on-going debate about mar-
ket efficiency, but also increase the evidence of psychological factors’ role
in the formation of stock prices. The implications would also be significant
for practical applications, potentially improving estimates of financial asset
prices or the cost of capital.
Succinctly, we find that George and Hwang (2004) momentum is small
and statistically insignificant for the US stock market, from 1980 to 2014,
though subperiod analysis shows results in line with the literature from
1980 to 2000 and its apparent disappearance, with negative average re-
turns, in the later period of 2001 to 2014. Results are qualitatively similar
though, contrarily to George and Hwang (2004), much stronger for Je-
gadeesh and Titman (1993) momentum. We also find, in accordance with
Daniel and Moskowitz (2016), that, due to their reliance on the continua-
tion of returns, following persistently bear markets and contemporaneously
with fast market reversals, momentum experiences crashes. We show that
such a particular and especially strong crash occurred in 2009, which seems
to drive the results for subperiod 2001-2014.
The tests on the asset pricing models show that, at worse, the inclusion
of a momentum risk factor does not have an influence on their ability to
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capture the 25 size-BE/ME Fama-French portfolios’ excess returns. How-
ever, for the 25 size-momentum portfolios, the inclusion of a momentum
risk factor is generally crucial, with the performance of the Carhart (1997)
4-factor model consistently surpassing that of our proposed 52W 4-factor
model. The only exception is for the subperiod 2001-2014, in which, as
addressed, the momentum effect seems to disappear and the performance
of both 4-factor models is very similar to that of the 3-factor model. Again
that seems, at least in part, to rise from the influence of the momentum
crash of 2009. If we exclude that year, momentum stages a reappearance,
though somewhat more subdued, and the necessity of a momentum factor
is, as for the complete sample, once again made clear.
Considering our results, and though as a whole they are not incompat-
ible with the anchor-and-adjust bias, the performance of the George and
Hwang (2004) momentum strategy on the subperiod 2001-2014 does not
allow us to exclude the possibility that this effect has been absorbed by the
market. However, Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) momentum seems to con-
tinue to show some resilience. It is possible, as such that the explanation
for momentum may lie in the traditional underreaction-overreaction area.
This paper is structured as follows. We provide a review of the main
literature concerning momentum and the 52-week high in section 2, address
our view of the implications of George and Hwang (2004) for asset pricing
models and the chosen methodology in section 3, present our findings in
section 4, and conclude in section 5.
2. LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1. Common Momentum Strategies and Exegeses
There is substantial evidence that returns are predictable, by variables
both at the aggregate and firm level (e.g., Bhandari 1988; Fama and French,
1989; Lee and Swaminathan 2000). Among the existing anomalies, the mo-
mentum effect identified by Jegadeesh and Titman (1993, 2001) represents
one of the most serious challenges to the EMH. The authors document that
a simple strategy that buys past winners and sells past losers generates rele-
vant abnormal returns over different 3- to 12- months selecting and holding
periods. The strategy maintains its profitability after its initial discovery,
which is especially relevant since other anomalies have tended to disappear
following the original studies (Schwert (2003)). The earliest theories of mo-
mentum proposed in the literature tend to focus either on the hypothesis of
underreaction or overreaction by the traders, and the consequent effect on
the movement of prices. De Bondt and Thaler (1985) had asserted that the
observed mean reversion in longer horizons is consistent with the hypoth-
esis of overreaction by traders to new information that, when corrected,
generates reversion of stock prices in the long run. Jegadeesh and Titman
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(1993) find this explanation simplistic, and hypothesize that transactions
by investors who buy past winners and sell past losers move prices away
from their long-run values temporarily.
Other relevant papers are Moskowitz and Grinblatt (1999), whose mo-
mentum strategy is based on the activity sector, consisting in buying stocks
from winning industries and selling stocks from past losing industries;
Rouwenhorst (1998) that applies Jegadeesh and Titman (1993)’s strategy
to 12 European countries reaching similar conclusions; and Rouwenhorst
(1999) which identifies the momentum effect in 20 emerging markets.
Daniel et al. (1998), Barberis et al. (1998) and Hong and Stein (1999),
seek to reconcile momentum and mean-reversion within a behavioral fi-
nance framework. Succinctly, momentum would result from psychological
biases affecting the behavior of investors, justifying the temporary diver-
gence of stock prices from its fundamental value.
Lee and Swaminathan (2000), in their study of trading volume, find it is
possible to create Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) style momentum portfolios
that exhibit reversals of the type documented by De Bondt and Thaler
(1985). The authors’ Momentum Life Cycle hypothesis presents the market
as in a constant state of convergence toward fundamental value, with stocks
experiencing periods of favoritism and neglect.
Klein (2001) and Grinblatt and Han (2005), strive to explain momentum
by expanding on Tversky and Kahneman (1974)’s adjustment and anchor-
ing bias effect. In Klein (2001) the acquisition price acts as the anchor
and the impact of taxes causes the divergence in prices. For Grinblatt and
Han (2005) the anchor is also the acquisition price but momentum arises
from some investors’ aversion to losses. We should note that there are sim-
ilarities between these approaches and that of George and Hwang (2004),
which also relies on an anchor effect, as we detail in the next subsection.
Another approach are the rational momentum models, including Berk et
al. (1999), Johnson (2002) and Shin (2006), that assume symmetric infor-
mation, and Albuquerque and Miao (2014) and Cespa and Vives (2014),
which assume asymmetric information.
Currently, momentum continues to be a puzzle and a much debated
topic in the literature, as exemplified by Chui et al. (2010)’s study on
individualism and momentum or the work of Israel and Moskowitz (2013).
Even considering the inconsistent performance of momentum in more recent
years, Barroso and Santa-Clara (2015) and Daniel and Moskowitz (2016)
show, through different techniques, that it is possible to improve the returns
of the strategy by actively managing its risk.
2.2. The 52-Week High and Momentum Investing
George and Hwang (2004) propose that the nearness of a stock’s price
to its 52-week high is able to explain most of the profits from momentum
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investing, and that this effect stems from an anchor and adjust bias. In this
view, investors would be reluctant to bid up stocks close to their 52-week
high while simultaneously averse to selling those farther from said anchor,
even when warranted by the available information. Comparing the strategy
with those of Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) and Moskowitz and Grinblatt
(1999), the authors find that the overall returns are all very close, but
that they capture distinct effects as highlighted by pairwise comparisons.
Combining all approaches on Fama and MacBeth (1973) cross-sectional
regressions, this again indicates that, among the strategies, nearness to the
52-week high is the better predictor of future returns.
In the 10 years since the publication of George and Hwang (2004)’s paper,
the studies applying the methodology to other markets generally confirm
the abnormal returns of the 52-week high strategy. Marshall and Cahan
(2005) and Du (2008) arrive at similar conclusions studying, respectively,
Australian stocks and MSCI country indices for 18 developed markets.
Gupta et al. (2010), Liu et al. (2011) and Bornholt and Malin (2011)
attest the abnormal returns of George and Hwang (2004)’s strategy, but
either the 52-week approach does not dominate the other strategies or they
seem to be independent. Li and Yu (2012) find that nearness to the 52-
week high predicts positive future returns while nearness to the historical
high predicts negative future returns. Finally, Bhootra and Hur (2013)
posit that stocks that have attained the 52-week price in the recent past
significantly outperform those that have attained so in the distant past.
3. HYPOTHESIS AND METHODOLOGY
3.1. Implications for Asset Pricing Models
The results of George and Hwang (2004) motivate us to study the impact
of the introduction of a new momentum risk factor, built according to the
52-week high strategy, on the overall performance of a given asset pricing
model.
As such, we formulate and propose the 52W 4-factor model, which cor-
responds to a variation of the 4-factor model of Carhart (1997), specified
as
E(Ri) = Rf+bi[E(RM )−Rf ]+siE(SMB)+hiE(HML)+miE(52W ) (1)
substituting the relative strength momentum factor E(WML) of Carhart
(1997) for the new momentum factor E(52W) built according to the 52-
week high strategy.
Succinctly, the 52W factor, similarly to the value-weighted SMB and
HML, and also to WML, corresponds to the monthly equal-weight average
returns of the 30 percent stocks with prices closest to their 52-week high
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minus the monthly equal-weight average returns of the 30 percent stocks
with prices farthest from their 52-week high.
3.2. Data and Methodology
We follow the methodology of Fama and French (2012), comparing our
own 4-factor model to Fama and French (1993, 1996) and Carhart (1997)’s
models’.
Our data sample includes all US stocks, listed on NYSE, NYSE MKT
and NASDAQ markets, from January 1980 to December 2014.
The tests comprise of time-series regressions of all models, seeking to
capture the excess monthly return of a number of Fama-French benchmark
portfolios, which we will next detail, following the ensuing formulations for
Fama-French 3-factor model:
Rit −Rft = αi + bi(RMt −Rft) + siSMBt + hiHMLt + εit (2)
Carhart 4-factor model:
Rit−Rft = αi+bi(RMt−Rft)+siSMBt+hiHMLt+wiWMLt+εit (3)
Proposed 52W 4-factor model:
Rit−Rft = αi + bi(RMt−Rft) + siSMBt +hiHMLt +mi52Wt + εit (4)
The monthly returns of the RM − Rf , SMB, HML and WML risk fac-
tors, as well as data on the portfolios’ returns, were all also collected from
Kenneth R French’s website1.
In turn, 52W had to be built from raw daily data of the stocks listed
on the NYSE, NYSE MKT and NASDAQ collected from DataStream. We
used all stocks, including dead and delisted, for the given period and to
insure results were not influenced by small and illiquid stocks, we excluded
stocks that were not traded during the previous month as well as stocks
under $5 following Jegadeesh and Titman (2001). At the beginning of
each month t stocks were ranked according to the nearness to the 52-
week high at the end of month t− 2, given by Pricei,t−2Highi,t−2 , where Pricei,t−2
is the price of stock i at the end of month t − 2 and Highi,t−2 is the
highest price of stock i during the 12-month period that ends on the last
day of month t − 2. 52W corresponds, for each month t, to the equal-
weighted returns of the winner portfolio, comprised of the top 30% ranking
stocks, minus the equal-weighted returns of the loser portfolio, constituted
by the 30% worst ranking stocks. As in George and Hwang (2004) we use
equal-weighted portfolios but, to increase comparison to WML, we skip the
1http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data library.html
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month between ranking and portfolio formation, and also do not consider
overlapping holding periods.
The tests on the explanatory power of the models, following Fama and
French (2012), evaluate the ability to capture the excess returns of a series
of Fama-French portfolios, specifically the 25 size-BE/ME and the 25 size-
momentum portfolios. We start by comparing the models’ performance
concerning the 25 size-BE/ME portfolios, given the well-known size and
value effects. We follow by testing the models on 25 size-momentum port-
folios, since it is expected that it is in these portfolios that the inclusion
of a momentum factor provides a clearer boost to the 3-factor model, as
the portfolios are built to expose the momentum effect. Finally, we also




The summary statistics from the risk factors are shown in Table 1. It
is clear that the US market risk premium continues to be large in the US
at 0.65% per month, and that the value premium is still a relevant 0.30%
per month, but that the returns of the size premium are small and are not
statistically significant. As regards the momentum effect, the competing
factors WML and 52W show very different performances for the period.
While WML has a high monthly return of 0.61% the 52W factor, prob-
lematically for our proposed model, achieves a modest and statistically
insignificant 0.12% per month.
However, Table 1 shows three additional aspects we must also consider,
namely (i) the relatively low to moderate correlations between the proposed
risk factors for the entire period, suggesting they are able to capture time-
series variation; (ii) that, when testing for robustness of the results, subpe-
riod analysis shows that both WML and 52W have different performances
for the subperiods 1980-2000 and 2001-2014; and (iii) that correlations for
the momentum risk factors also change substantially for the subperiods.
Specifically, 52W achieves a statistically significant average return of
0.43% per month in the period from 1980 to 2000 (WML is an impressive
0.97%), very much in line with the results of George and Hwang (2004), but
falls to a statistically insignificant average monthly return of −0.34% in the
period from 2001 to 2014 (WML falls to an also statistically insignificant
0.07% per month). As already discussed, correlations between WML and
52W are significant for the entire sample, but increase impressively from
0.42 in 1980-2000 to 0.84 in 2001-2014. As such, our results are concordant
with the finding of George and Hwang (2004) — whose sample period is
from 1963 to 2001 — that these are different effects up to 2000, but put
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TABLE 1.
Summary Statistics for the Risk Factors
Average Median Cross-Correlations
Risk Monthly Std. t-stat Monthly
Factors Return Dev. Return RM −Rf SMB HML WML 52W
RM −Rf 0.65 4.51 2.95 1.16 1.00 - - - -
SMB 0.13 3.06 0.87 0.00 0.24 1.00 - - -
HML 0.30 3.03 2.04 0.27 −0.33 −0.31 1.00 - -
WML 0.61 4.57 2.74 0.72 −0.12 0.06 −0.17 1.00 -
52W 0.12 3.86 0.65 0.50 −0.45 −0.34 0.26 0.68 1.00
WML (80-00) 0.97 3.82 4.03 1.05 0.21 0.26 −0.41 1.00 -
WML (01-14) 0.07 5.46 0.17 0.39 −0.48 −0.19 0.10 1.00 -
52W(80-00) 0.43 2.94 2.33 0.72 −0.28 −0.27 0.30 0.42 1.00
52W (01-14) −0.34 4.90 −0.91 0.16 −0.64 −0.47 0.25 0.84 1.00
RM −Rf corresponds to the value-weighted return of all CRSP firms incorporated in
the US and listed on the NYSE, NYSE MKT, and NASDAQ that have a CRSP share
code of 10 or 11 minus the one-month Treasury bill rate from Ibbotson Associates. The
factors SMB and HML are constructed using 6 value-weighted portfolios formed on the
intersections of 2 portfolios formed on size and 3 portfolios formed on book-to-market,
SMB being the average return on the three small portfolios (value / neutral / growth)
minus the average return on the three big portfolios (value / neutral / growth) and
HML the average return on the two value portfolios (small / big) minus the average
return on the two growth portfolios (small / big). The risk factor WML is built from
6 value-weighted portfolios formed on the intersections of 2 portfolios formed on size
and 3 portfolios formed on prior t − 12 to t − 2 month returns, and corresponds to
the monthly average return of the two high prior return portfolios minus the average
return of the two low prior return portfolios. Data for RM − Rf , SMB, HML and
WML risk factors were all collected from Kenneth R. French’s website. 52W is a
momentum factor built according to the 52-week high strategy, using all stocks listed
on the NYSE, NYSE MKT and NASDAQ, collected from DataStream, excluding
stocks under $5 and stocks not traded during the previous month, corresponding to
the equal-weighted returns of the 30% top ranked stocks minus the equal-weighted
returns of the 30% worst ranked stocks. Returns are calculated in simple monthly
percent. Sample period is January 1980 to December 2014.
them into question in the subsequent time-frame of 2001-2014 and for our
whole period.
As more thoroughly addressed in subsection 4.3.3, it appears as though,
in the more recent years, there seems to be no momentum effect in the US
market but, when looking at monthly median returns, 52W achieves 0.50%
for the whole period of 1980-2014 (WML 0.72%), 0.72% for the subperiod
1980-2000 (WML 1.05%), and 0.16% for the subperiod 2001-2014 (WML
0.39%). The underlying reason for the behavior of both 52W and WML
seems to be related to more frequent periods of rapid inversion of market
trends in the years of 2001-2014 appearing that, due to their reliance on
the continuation of returns, it corresponds to periods in which momentum
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strategies appear to perform very negatively. In particular, both the returns
for 52W and WML in the period are very affected by the impact of a single
year, 2009, in which they respectively lose an astounding average of −4.18%
and −5.43% per month. In subsection 4.3.3 we further discuss the nature
of this apparent disappearance of momentum in 2001-2014.
Turning to the benchmark portfolios, the interpretation of the excess
returns of the 25 size-BE/ME portfolios, shown below in Table 2, seems to
be very much in line with the individual observations for the size (SMB)
and value (HML) risk factors.
TABLE 2.
Summary Statistics for Monthly Percent Excess Returns on 25 Size-BE/ME
Portfolios
Average Standard Deviation
Growth 2 3 4 Value Growth 2 3 4 Value
Small 0.08 0.84 0.89 1.02 1.10 7.90 6.70 5.61 5.26 5.65
2 0.49 0.80 1.00 0.97 0.94 7.11 5.77 5.16 5.10 5.80
3 0.62 0.87 0.86 0.90 1.13 6.60 5.39 4.92 4.87 5.19
4 0.80 0.76 0.79 0.84 0.88 5.96 5.17 5.15 4.67 5.19
Big 0.66 0.73 0.63 0.63 0.77 4.71 4.58 4.56 4.37 5.08
The portfolios of NYSE, NYSE MKT and NASDAQ stocks, built each June, are the intersections
of 5 portfolios formed on size (ME) and 5 portfolios formed on the ratio of book to market equity
(BE/ME). The size breakpoints for year t are the NYSE market equity quintiles at the end of
June of t. BE/ME for June of year t is the ratio of BE for the last fiscal year end in t − 1 to
ME for December of t− 1. The BE/ME breakpoints are NYSE quintiles. Rf is the one-month
Treasury bill rate at the beginning of the month t. All data from Kenneth R. French’s website.
Sample period is January 1980 to December 2014.
When analyzing the results, there seems to be no size effect for the lowest
BE/ME quintile, with even an observed inverse size effect, though the size
premium seems to apply in the remaining BE/ME quintiles, in line with
the observed small average monthly return of SMB. On the other hand,
the value effect seems very clear, independently of the size quintile, noting
however that the effect seems especially large in small caps, with an excess
return of 1.10% per month, in line with Siegel (2014).
As regards the excess returns of the 25 size-momentum portfolios, ex-
hibited below in Panel A of Table 3, the interpretation concerning the size
effect is somewhat similar to that of the 25 size-BE/ME portfolios.
There seems to be an inverse size effect in the extreme loser quintile,
and an inexistent size effect in the second momentum quintile, but the size
premium appears to hold in the remaining quintiles. Momentum seems to
be clearly present in all size quintiles, with an increasing trend in excess
returns from the left (extreme loser) to the right (extreme winner) quintiles,
again especially large in small caps.
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TABLE 3.




Loser 2 3 4 Winner Loser 2 3 4 Winner
Small −0.02 0.63 0.89 1.06 1.38 8.03 5.49 5.00 5.13 6.55
2 0.25 0.73 0.90 1.05 1.27 8.07 5.77 5.11 5.18 6.72
3 0.45 0.69 0.83 0.88 1.16 7.57 5.45 4.93 4.88 6.37
4 0.37 0.74 0.85 0.88 1.02 7.68 5.51 4.74 4.63 5.91
Big 0.42 0.67 0.52 0.73 0.85 7.05 4.89 4.35 4.34 5.34
Panel B: 1980-2000
Average Standard Deviation
Loser 2 3 4 Winner Loser 2 3 4 Winner
Small −0.70 0.42 0.75 0.94 1.45 6.51 4.82 4.65 5.02 6.82
2 −0.21 0.46 0.81 1.05 1.50 6.47 5.03 4.83 5.04 7.10
3 0.18 0.49 0.69 0.92 1.41 6.11 4.92 4.61 4.83 6.79
4 0.32 0.67 0.71 0.86 1.30 6.09 5.14 4.66 4.75 6.23
Big 0.57 0.79 0.53 0.83 1.04 5.87 4.48 4.44 4.60 5.79
Panel C: 2001-2014
Average Standard Deviation
Loser 2 3 4 Winner Loser 2 3 4 Winner
Small 1.00 0.95 1.09 1.24 1.26 9.82 6.35 5.49 5.29 6.14
2 0.95 1.13 1.02 1.06 0.92 9.97 6.72 5.50 5.40 6.10
3 0.85 1.00 1.03 0.84 0.78 9.35 6.16 5.38 4.96 5.68
4 0.44 0.85 1.06 0.90 0.60 9.60 6.04 4.87 4.47 5.40
Big 0.19 0.50 0.50 0.57 0.58 8.54 5.46 4.21 3.91 4.59
The portfolios of NYSE, NYSE MKT and NASDAQ stocks, constructed monthly, are the inter-
sections of 5 portfolios formed on size (ME) and 5 portfolios formed on prior t−12 to t−2 returns
(the strategy skips the sort month). The size breakpoints are the NYSE market equity quintiles.
The monthly prior t − 12 to t − 2 return breakpoints are NYSE quintiles. Rf is the one-month
Treasury bill rate at the beginning of the month t. All data from Kenneth R. French’s website.
Sample period is January 1980 to December 2014.
Since we aim to address the robustness of the results, by analyzing sub-
periods 1980-2000 and 2001-2014, we also show the summary statistics of
the 25 size-momentum portfolios for these subperiods. The results for sub-
period 1980-2000, shown in Panel B of Table 3, are qualitatively similar to
those of the entire period but with significantly higher momentum spreads
between the winner and loser quintiles, in line with the higher average
returns of both WML and 52W. For the subperiod 2001-2014 (Panel C),
however, the size effect makes an impressive comeback, with clearly higher
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returns for small caps, but the momentum effect, again concurrently with
the disappointing returns of WML and 52W, is, at best, tenuous.
4.2. Asset Pricing Tests for the 25 size-BE/ME Portfolios
The summary results for the tests on the 25 size-BE/ME portfolios
are presented in Table 4. Analyzing the regressions α it seems that the
Fama and French (1993, 1996) 3-factor model is able to capture most of
the excess returns, with an average absolute α of 0.12%. However, concur-
rently with the existing literature, it leaves significant unexplained returns
in the lowest BE/ME quintile, especially a large negative return for low
BE/ME microcaps stocks of around −0.69% per month. Additionally, the
3-factor model leaves a hint of the value effect on the smallest size quintile
and creates a reverse value effect in the biggest size quintile. The explana-
tion follows from the fact that value-growth spreads are larger for smaller
stocks and the spreads in the HML loadings are not wider for these same
smaller stocks. As a result, the model underestimates the value-growth
spreads in microcaps while overestimating the spread for large caps (in the
particular case of low BE/ME microcaps there seems to be an additional
overestimation of the spread for the size effect).
TABLE 4.
Regressions for Monthly Percent Excess Returns on 25 Size-BE/ME
Portfolios (Jan. 1980 - Dec. 2014)
Fama-French 3-Factor Model
Rit −Rft = αi + bi(RMt −Rft) + siSMBt + hiHMLt + εit
Growth 2 3 4 Value Growth 2 3 4 Value
α t(α)
Small −0.69 0.05 0.10 0.19 0.13 −5.41 0.59 1.46 2.49 1.61
2 −0.24 −0.01 0.15 0.08 −0.13 −3.27 −0.07 2.11 1.04 −1.74
3 −0.03 0.05 0.01 0.01 0.16 −0.42 0.69 0.13 0.10 1.47
4 0.19 −0.04 −0.10 −0.01 −0.10 2.28 −0.39 −1.01 −0.08 −1.21
Big 0.18 0.09 −0.08 −0.16 −0.13 3.30 1.04 −0.93 −2.06 −1.09
Average |α| 0.12 -
R2 s(e)
Small 0.90 0.93 0.94 0.93 0.93 2.45 1.77 1.33 1.40 1.47
2 0.95 0.94 0.93 0.93 0.94 1.52 1.46 1.34 1.39 1.40
3 0.95 0.90 0.88 0.88 0.88 1.50 1.71 1.68 1.69 1.86
4 0.94 0.88 0.87 0.87 0.87 1.50 1.76 1.86 1.69 1.87
Big 0.95 0.89 0.87 0.89 0.80 1.10 1.49 1.67 1.45 2.27
Average R2 0.91 -
Adding a momentum factor, be it either WML or 52W, seems to have
virtually no effect in the power of the regressions on the excess returns on
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TABLE 4—Continued
Carhart 4-Factor Model
Rit −Rft = αi + bi(RMt −Rft) + siSMBt + hiHMLt + wiWMLt + εit
Growth 2 3 4 Value Growth 2 3 4 Value
α t(α)
Small −0.62 0.05 0.09 0.17 0.17 −4.77 0.65 1.35 2.23 1.96
2 −0.18 0.02 0.15 0.08 −0.11 −2.77 0.26 2.38 1.08 −1.50
3 0.01 0.09 0.02 0.02 0.20 0.18 1.02 0.27 0.24 1.77
4 0.19 −0.02 −0.04 0.01 −0.05 2.42 −0.19 −0.44 0.16 −0.62
Big 0.20 0.06 −0.09 −0.13 −0.08 3.64 0.72 −1.00 −1.69 −0.70
Average |α| 0.11 -
R2 s(e)
Small 0.91 0.93 0.94 0.93 0.93 2.43 1.77 1.33 1.40 1.46
2 0.96 0.94 0.93 0.93 0.94 1.49 1.46 1.35 1.40 1.40
3 0.95 0.90 0.88 0.88 0.87 1.48 1.71 1.68 1.69 1.85
4 0.94 0.88 0.87 0.87 0.87 1.50 1.76 1.84 1.69 1.85
Big 0.95 0.90 0.87 0.89 0.80 1.10 1.48 1.67 1.45 2.25
Average R2 0.91 -
52W 4-Factor Model
Rit −Rft = αi + bi(RMt −Rft) + siSMBt + hiHMLt +mi52Wt + εit
Growth 2 3 4 Value Growth 2 3 4 Value
α t(α)
Small −0.62 0.06 0.08 0.20 0.16 −4.88 0.71 1.28 2.37 1.79
2 −0.21 −0.01 0.13 0.06 −0.13 −3.13 −0.12 1.99 0.90 −1.70
3 −0.02 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.18 −0.21 0.64 0.00 0.03 1.64
4 0.19 −0.04 −0.10 −0.01 −0.08 2.36 −0.44 −1.01 −0.13 −0.99
Big 0.18 0.06 −0.09 −0.15 −0.09 3.32 0.70 −1.04 −2.07 −0.78
Average |α| 0.12 -
R2 s(e)
Small 0.91 0.93 0.94 0.93 0.93 2.36 1.77 1.32 1.40 1.45
2 0.96 0.94 0.93 0.93 0.94 1.49 1.46 1.34 1.39 1.40
3 0.95 0.90 0.88 0.88 0.87 1.49 1.72 1.68 1.69 1.85
4 0.94 0.88 0.87 0.87 0.87 1.50 1.77 1.87 1.69 1.86
Big 0.95 0.90 0.87 0.89 0.81 1.11 1.47 1.67 1.46 2.23
Average R2 0.91 -
The table shows the results from time-series regressions of the Fama and French (1993, 1996)
3-factor model, Carhart (1997) 4-factor model and 52W 4-factor model on the monthly per-
cent excess returns of the 25 portfolios created from 5 × 5 sorts on size and BE/ME.
Reported only the α, respective HAC Newey-West t-statistics, adjusted R2 and the regres-
sions’ standard errors (for complete Tables contact the authors). Sample period is January
1980 to December 2014.
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the 25 size-BE/ME portfolios. The inclusion of WML reduces the average
absolute α from 0.12% to 0.11%, while the inclusion of 52W has no impact
on the average absolute α. Unsurprisingly, the loadings for the WML
or the 52W factors (not shown) are very small and mostly statistically
insignificant, while the impact on the adjusted R2 is irrelevant.
A more relevant test of the momentum factors is presented in the next
subsection when we address their power on the excess returns of the 25
size-momentum portfolios.
4.3. Asset Pricing Tests for the 25 Size-Momentum Portfolios
The results of the regressions of all 3 models on the excess returns of the
25 size-momentum portfolios are shown below in Table 5.
The Fama and French (1993, 1996) model fares much worse on these port-
folios, with a high average absolute α of 0.31%, while estimating strongly
negative intercepts for short-term losers and high positive intercepts for
short-term winners, with an average adjusted R2 of 0.82. The problem is
past losers load more on RM−Rf and HML than past winners (not shown),
and as such the model predicts the reversal of future returns for both losers
and winners, missing the short-term continuation of the returns.
In this case, introducing a momentum factor (either WML or 52W) sig-
nificantly reduces the average absolute α and provides a boost to the av-
erage adjusted R2.
The results for the Carhart (1997) 4-factor model show a decrease of the
average absolute α to 0.14% and an improvement of the average adjusted
R2 to 0.90. However there are still clearly traces of the momentum effect on
the two lowest size quintiles, the greatest problem being the high negative
intercept of the microcaps’ losers (−0.45%), while the model also creates a
mild reverse momentum effect for large caps.
The question is that, as previously shown in Table 3, and addressed in
subsection 4.1, the momentum returns are greater for small caps than for
large caps, while the spreads in the WML factor loadings (not shown) from
losers to winners are at least as large for the biggest size quintiles as for
the smallest size quintiles.
Our own 52W 4-factor model also corresponds to an improvement relative
to the 3-factor model, but less so than the Carhart (1997) 4-factor model,
reducing the average α to a still economically relevant 0.20% and improving
the average adjusted R2 to 0.88. The intercepts for the short-term losers
remain strongly negative, once again the microcap losers being the greatest
problem with −0.75%, and the intercepts for short-term winners, especially
in the three smaller size quintiles, remain strongly positive. The issue is
that besides having similar but less severe difficulties as the Carhart (1997)
model in capturing the different momentum spreads for the distinct size
quintiles, the loadings on the HML factor (not shown) continue to predict
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TABLE 5.
Regressions for Monthly Percent Excess Returns on 25 Size-Momentum
Portfolios (Jan. 1980 - Dec. 2014)
Fama-French 3-Factor Model
Rit −Rft = αi + bi(RMt −Rft) + siSMBt + hiHMLt + εit
Loser 2 3 4 Winner Loser 2 3 4 Winner
α t(α)
Small −1.08 −0.24 0.08 0.29 0.57 −5.74 −2.36 0.94 3.19 4.01
2 −0.86 −0.19 0.07 0.25 0.45 −4.70 −1.72 0.86 3.46 4.42
3 −0.57 −0.18 0.00 0.09 0.39 −2.85 −1.56 −0.02 0.93 3.70
4 −0.66 −0.14 0.07 0.15 0.34 −2.94 −1.23 0.63 1.72 2.71
Big −0.48 −0.04 −0.13 0.12 0.28 −2.10 −0.30 −1.63 1.42 2.50
Average |α| 0.31 -
R2 s(e)
Small 0.73 0.87 0.89 0.89 0.87 4.20 1.98 1.63 1.69 2.36
2 0.77 0.86 0.90 0.92 0.90 3.90 2.15 1.63 1.45 2.08
3 0.70 0.84 0.88 0.87 0.87 4.15 2.17 1.72 1.75 2.28
4 0.64 0.81 0.86 0.87 0.80 4.58 2.41 1.75 1.70 2.61
Big 0.62 0.75 0.88 0.86 0.77 4.36 2.47 1.49 1.61 2.57
Average R2 0.82 -
Carhart 4-Factor Model
Rit −Rft = αi + bi(RMt −Rft) + siSMBt + hiHMLt + wiWMLt + εit
Loser 2 3 4 Winner Loser 2 3 4 Winner
α t(α)
Small −0.45 −0.03 0.13 0.24 0.36 −2.96 −0.42 1.71 2.47 2.78
2 −0.20 0.08 0.12 0.21 0.19 −1.72 0.91 1.42 2.64 2.24
3 0.10 0.08 0.11 0.01 0.08 0.82 0.86 1.24 0.12 1.00
4 0.07 0.18 0.18 0.07 −0.03 0.55 1.97 1.85 0.81 −0.24
Big 0.18 0.32 −0.05 −0.03 −0.10 1.03 3.79 −0.63 −0.32 −1.26
Average |α| 0.14 -
R2 s(e)
Small 0.89 0.91 0.90 0.89 0.90 2.65 1.66 1.61 1.68 2.06
2 0.95 0.92 0.90 0.92 0.95 1.80 1.61 1.61 1.43 1.50
3 0.91 0.91 0.89 0.88 0.94 2.21 1.66 1.61 1.71 1.58
4 0.89 0.90 0.88 0.87 0.91 2.51 1.75 1.65 1.65 1.79
Big 0.86 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.91 2.63 1.61 1.45 1.42 1.58
Average R2 0.90 -
a reversal of the future returns. The results indicate that the 52W factor is
unable to capture the momentum effect as well as the WML factor, leaving
the overall performance of the 52W model somewhere between the 3-factor
model and Carhart (1997)’s model.
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TABLE 5—Continued
52W 4-Factor Model
Rit −Rft = αi + bi(RMt −Rft) + siSMBt + hiHMLt +mi52Wt + εit
Loser 2 3 4 Winner Loser 2 3 4 Winner
α t(α)
Small −0.75 −0.14 0.10 0.26 0.50 −4.38 −1.47 1.22 2.84 3.59
2 −0.55 −0.07 0.08 0.22 0.35 −4.29 −0.80 0.92 3.04 3.44
3 −0.24 −0.08 0.03 0.04 0.25 −1.90 −0.74 0.33 0.40 2.56
4 −0.32 −0.02 0.11 0.10 0.17 −1.91 −0.21 1.02 1.16 1.44
Big −0.20 0.10 −0.10 0.05 0.14 −0.93 0.99 −1.23 0.66 1.41
Average |α| 0.20 -
R2 s(e)
Small 0.88 0.90 0.89 0.89 0.88 2.82 1.76 1.62 1.68 2.25
2 0.91 0.90 0.90 0.93 0.93 2.46 1.84 1.63 1.42 1.84
3 0.87 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.92 2.74 1.92 1.69 1.68 1.84
4 0.82 0.85 0.87 0.88 0.88 3.26 2.13 1.72 1.64 2.08
Big 0.76 0.82 0.89 0.88 0.84 3.46 2.09 1.47 1.49 2.15
Average R2 0.88 -
The table shows the results from time-series regressions of the Fama and French (1993,
1996) 3-factor model, Carhart (1997) 4-factor model and 52W 4-factor model on the
monthly percent excess returns of the 25 portfolios created from 5 × 5 sorts on size and
momentum. Reported only the α, respective HAC Newey-West t-statistics, adjusted R2
and the regressions’ standard errors (for complete Tables contact the authors). Sample
period is January 1980 to December 2014.
On one hand, the results are not surprising, considering the summary
statistics shown in Table 1 for WML and 52W, with WML exhibiting far
larger average returns and variance, indicating a greater capacity to explain
the portfolios’ excess returns. However, on the other hand, we must also
take into account that, since the portfolios are built on Jegadeesh and
Titman (1993) momentum, there is a tilt towards the excess returns being
better captured by the model with the WML factor.
Since the robustness test of the risk factors shows very different average
premiums for both WML and 52W, in the subperiods 1980-2000 and 2001-
2014, we repeat the regressions on the 25 size-momentum portfolios for
these subsamples.
4.3.1. Asset Pricing Tests for the 25 Size-Momentum Portfolios (1980-
2000)
The results for the subperiod 1980-2000, presented in Table 6, show
that the issues for all the 3 models are qualitatively similar to those of
the entire period 1980-2014, although they appear to be greatly magnified.
We suggest this is a consequence from the combined effect that momentum
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returns are much larger during this subperiod and, concurrently, the sample
period is much smaller.
TABLE 6.
Regressions for Monthly Percent Excess Returns on 25 Size-Momentum
Portfolios (Jan. 1980 - Dec. 2000)
Fama-French 3-Factor Model
Rit −Rft = αi + bi(RMt −Rft) + siSMBt + hiHMLt + εit
Loser 2 3 4 Winner Loser 2 3 4 Winner
α t(α)
Small −1.59 −0.39 −0.05 0.12 0.70 −8.58 −3.12 −0.44 1.13 3.95
2 −1.17 −0.43 −0.07 0.19 0.71 −5.53 −3.10 −0.64 1.80 5.73
3 −0.80 −0.47 −0.25 −0.02 0.59 −3.29 −3.31 −2.00 −0.21 5.26
4 −0.70 −0.37 −0.26 −0.08 0.57 −2.34 −2.42 −2.25 −0.79 4.41
Big −0.35 −0.02 −0.30 0.02 0.31 −1.30 −0.13 −3.03 0.18 2.27
Average |α| 0.42 -
R2 s(e)
Small 0.77 0.85 0.86 0.90 0.89 3.17 1.90 1.75 1.62 2.24
2 0.80 0.84 0.88 0.91 0.93 2.89 2.00 1.68 1.48 1.90
3 0.70 0.81 0.85 0.86 0.91 3.36 2.17 1.78 1.82 1.98
4 0.61 0.77 0.84 0.87 0.88 3.81 2.49 1.86 1.68 2.20
Big 0.56 0.69 0.88 0.89 0.84 3.92 2.50 1.54 1.50 2.29
Average R2 0.82 -
Carhart 4-Factor Model
Rit −Rft = αi + bi(RMt −Rft) + siSMBt + hiHMLt + wiWMLt + εit
Loser 2 3 4 Winner Loser 2 3 4 Winner
α t(α)
Small −0.97 −0.09 0.09 0.10 0.43 −6.18 −0.76 0.77 0.76 2.78
2 −0.43 −0.04 0.10 0.18 0.37 −3.62 −0.41 0.86 1.48 3.29
3 0.02 −0.05 −0.04 −0.04 0.24 0.15 −0.41 −0.29 −0.26 2.26
4 0.24 0.19 0.01 −0.09 0.14 1.35 1.50 0.08 −0.79 1.14
Big 0.62 0.57 −0.12 −0.13 −0.24 3.45 4.43 −1.25 −1.45 −2.66
Average |α| 0.22 -
R2 s(e)
Small 0.85 0.89 0.87 0.90 0.91 2.50 1.63 1.69 1.62 2.08
2 0.93 0.90 0.89 0.91 0.95 1.69 1.57 1.59 1.48 1.57
3 0.88 0.88 0.87 0.86 0.94 2.15 1.70 1.65 1.82 1.64
4 0.85 0.88 0.87 0.87 0.92 2.38 1.76 1.65 1.69 1.74
Big 0.83 0.86 0.90 0.90 0.94 2.45 1.67 1.43 1.43 1.48
Average R2 0.89 -
The regressions on the 3-factor model show overall large α, corresponding
to an average absolute of 0.42%, with especially large negative intercepts
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TABLE 6—Continued
52W 4-Factor Model
Rit −Rft = αi + bi(RMt −Rft) + siSMBt + hiHMLt +mi52Wt + εit
Loser 2 3 4 Winner Loser 2 3 4 Winner
α t(α)
Small −1.25 −0.24 0.02 0.11 0.65 −5.64 −1.73 0.16 0.89 3.47
2 −0.85 −0.28 −0.04 0.16 0.63 −4.99 −2.21 −0.41 1.46 4.24
3 −0.46 −0.34 −0.20 -0.07 0.45 −2.38 −2.56 −1.65 −0.50 3.89
4 −0.35 −0.21 −0.19 −0.11 0.38 -1.36 −1.38 −1.58 −1.11 2.84
Big −0.01 0.17 −0.23 −0.04 0.15 −0.05 1.04 −2.21 −0.50 1.25
Average |α| 0.30 -
R2 s(e)
Small 0.85 0.88 0.87 0.90 0.89 2.50 1.68 1.71 1.62 2.23
2 0.88 0.87 0.88 0.92 0.93 2.20 1.78 1.67 1.47 1.84
3 0.79 0.83 0.85 0.86 0.93 2.78 2.04 1.76 1.81 1.82
4 0.71 0.80 0.85 0.88 0.90 3.26 2.32 1.82 1.68 1.94
Big 0.67 0.75 0.89 0.90 0.87 3.41 0.75 1.48 1.47 2.11
Average R2 0.85 -
The table shows the results from time-series regressions of the Fama and French (1993,
1996) 3-factor model, Carhart (1997) 4-factor model and 52W 4-factor model on the
monthly percent excess returns of the 25 portfolios created from 5 × 5 sorts on size and
momentum. Reported only the α, respective HAC Newey-West t-statistics, adjusted R2
and the regressions’ standard errors (for complete Tables contact the authors). Sample
period is January 1980 to December 2000.
in short-term losers and large positive intercepts in past winners. Again
the factor loadings in HML and also very slightly on RM −Rf (not shown)
continue to be larger for past losers than for past winners, erroneously
predicting the future reversal of returns.
The Carhart (1997) model once again corresponds to a vast improvement
relative to the 3-factor model, reducing the overall average absolute α to
0.22% while increasing the average adjusted R2 to 0.89. However, not only
does the model not capture the momentum effect on small caps, with large
negative intercepts for small cap losers and large positive intercepts for
small cap winners, it also creates a very significant reverse momentum effect
for large caps. Succinctly, the problems already observed for the entire
period, shown in Table 5, also apply in the subperiod 1980-2000. However,
the spreads in the WML factor loadings (not shown) are now even larger,
especially for the biggest size than smallest size quintiles, exacerbating the
issue.
The performance of the 52W 4-factor model lies somewhere between the
Fama and French (1993, 1996) and Carhart (1997) models, as occurs for
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the entire period. The average absolute α is 0.30%, still very high de-
spite a clear advance relative to the 3-factor model, and clearly worse than
the 0.22% of the Carhart (1997) 4-factor model. The average adjusted R2
improves slightly to 0.85. The problems with the intercepts correspond
mostly, but not exclusively, to large negative intercepts in almost all short-
term losers size quintiles and generally large positive intercepts for short-
term winners. Once again the spreads in the 52W factor (not shown) fail
to account for the different momentum returns for each size quintile. Ad-
ditionally, the loadings on the HML factor (not shown) continue to predict
a future, though unobserved, reversion of the returns.
In summary, notwithstanding the fact that the performance of all models
is worse for the subperiod of 1980-2000, the conclusions are similar to those
of the entire period.
4.3.2. Asset Pricing Tests for the 25 Size-Momentum Portfolios (2001-
2014)
The results for the subperiod 2001-2014 are presented in Table 7 and,
as the momentum effect is much more diffuse in the subsample, Fama and
French (1993, 1996) model’s performance improves and is again much closer
to that of the other models.
The 3-factor model’s average absolute α is 0.22%, and the average ad-
justed R2 is 0.85, but problems persist in the individual intercepts. Though
the trend is not as clear, the model continues to show large negative in-
tercepts for extreme losers and generally relevant positive intercepts in all
other quintiles. In this case, it is the loadings of RM − Rf and SMB (not
shown) that lead to the prediction of the future reversal of returns.
The introduction of WML does not lead, in this case, to quite as impres-
sive results, with the Carhart (1997) 4-factor model exhibiting an average
absolute α on these portfolios of 0.19%, a very slight decrease relative to
the 3-factor model. This is somewhat expected as the average WML for
this subperiod is a mere 0.07%. The issues remain with the individual in-
tercepts but now without leaving a clear pattern. However, it is relevant
to note that the loadings for WML (not shown) are mostly statistically
significant and that the average adjusted R2 improves to 0.92.
As regards the 52W 4-factor model, as would be expected considering
that the 52W factor achieves an insignificant negative average return of
−0.34%, the performance of the model is virtually identical to the Fama
and French (1993, 1996) model. The average absolute α is 0.21% and
the patterns in the individual intercepts do not significantly vary from
those of the 3-factor model. Again, as in the Carhart (1997) model, the
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TABLE 7.
Regressions for Monthly Percent Excess Returns on 25 Size-Momentum
Portfolios (Jan. 2001 - Dec. 2014)
Fama-French 3-Factor Model
Rit −Rft = αi + bi(RMt −Rft) + siSMBt + hiHMLt + εit
Loser 2 3 4 Winner Loser 2 3 4 Winner
α t(α)
Small −0.19 −0.01 0.24 0.45 0.38 −0.51 −0.03 1.84 3.18 1.77
2 −0.25 0.18 0.19 0.25 0.07 −0.76 1.09 1.55 2.53 0.47
3 −0.13 0.22 0.29 0.15 0.06 −0.39 1.40 2.60 1.27 0.33
4 −0.47 0.14 0.45 0.35 0.01 −1.62 1.02 3.91 3.28 0.03
Big −0.44 0.01 0.09 0.18 0.18 −1.43 0.10 0.84 1.51 0.98
Average |α| 0.22 -
R2 s(e)
Small 0.76 0.90 0.93 0.89 0.85 4.88 1.97 1.40 1.76 2.40
2 0.80 0.90 0.94 0.94 0.88 4.51 2.11 1.39 1.30 2.07
3 0.77 0.91 0.93 0.90 0.82 4.51 1.88 1.47 1.56 2.41
4 0.75 0.89 0.93 0.88 0.71 4.76 2.00 1.26 1.54 2.90
Big 0.74 0.83 0.90 0.84 0.65 4.37 2.23 1.37 1.57 2.70
Average R2 0.85 -
Carhart 4-Factor Model
Rit −Rft = αi + bi(RMt −Rft) + siSMBt + hiHMLt + wiWMLt + εit
Loser 2 3 4 Winner Loser 2 3 4 Winner
α t(α)
Small 0.07 0.06 0.24 0.42 0.30 0.33 0.42 1.90 2.85 1.43
2 0.01 0.26 0.19 0.22 −0.03 0.05 2.04 1.52 2.31 −0.24
3 0.11 0.29 0.31 0.10 −0.06 0.63 2.19 2.81 0.91 −0.51
4 −0.22 0.22 0.46 0.30 −0.13 −1.42 1.96 4.00 2.88 −0.76
Big −0.23 0.12 0.11 0.12 0.05 −0.96 1.34 0.96 1.01 0.38
Average |α| 0.19 -
R2 s(e)
Small 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.89 0.89 2.59 1.63 1.40 1.71 2.04
2 0.97 0.95 0.94 0.95 0.95 1.70 1.56 1.39 1.21 1.38
3 0.94 0.94 0.93 0.92 0.93 2.26 1.47 1.41 1.36 1.47
4 0.92 0.94 0.93 0.91 0.89 2.63 1.48 1.25 1.33 1.82
Big 0.89 0.93 0.90 0.90 0.87 2.75 1.40 1.34 1.25 1.65
Average R2 0.92 -
loadings for 52W (not shown) are mostly statistically significant but do not
meaningfully improve the overall performance.
In summary, for the subperiod 2001-2014, the apparent disappearance of
momentum (at least partly connected with the very negative performance
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TABLE 7—Continued
52W 4-Factor Model
Rit −Rft = αi + bi(RMt −Rft) + siSMBt + hiHMLt +mi52Wt + εit
Loser 2 3 4 Winner Loser 2 3 4 Winner
α t(α)
Small −0.18 −0.01 0.24 0.45 0.38 −0.72 −0.03 1.83 3.07 1.75
2 −0.25 0.17 0.19 0.24 0.07 −1.29 1.21 1.53 2.68 0.57
3 −0.13 0.22 0.29 0.15 0.06 −0.82 1.53 2.57 1.34 0.42
4 −0.46 0.14 0.44 0.35 0.00 −2.08 1.16 3.95 3.22 0.02
Big −0.44 0.02 0.09 0.18 0.18 −1.42 0.13 0.85 1.40 1.29
Average |α| 0.21 -
R2 s(e)
Small 0.91 0.92 0.93 0.89 0.87 3.02 1.84 1.40 1.73 2.24
2 0.93 0.92 0.94 0.95 0.92 2.61 1.86 1.39 1.19 1.73
3 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.90 2.45 1.66 1.46 1.34 1.79
4 0.90 0.92 0.93 0.91 0.84 3.03 1.72 1.27 1.35 2.19
Big 0.84 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.80 3.40 1.81 1.37 1.33 2.07
Average R2 0.90 -
The table shows the results from time-series regressions of the Fama and French (1993,
1996) 3-factor model, Carhart (1997) 4-factor model and 52W 4-factor model on the
monthly percent excess returns of the 25 portfolios created from 5 × 5 sorts on size and
momentum. Reported only the α, respective HAC Newey-West t-statistics, adjusted R2
and the regressions’ standard errors (for complete Tables contact the authors). Sample
period is January 2001 to December 2014.
of the strategy in 2009), already addressed in subsection 4.1, leads to both
the Carhart (1997) and 52W 4-factor models representing irrelevant im-
provements relative to the 3-factor model. However, both improve the
adjusted R2. The relevance of the WML and 52W factors depends, then,
on whether this corresponds to an effective absorption of the anomaly by
the market or if, contrarily, it is at least partly the result of the outlier year
of 2009. Concurrently, we discuss this issue in greater detail over the next
subsection.
4.3.3. Momentum Returns: The Specific Case of the Year 2009
In order to address the eventual distinct nature of the year 2009, we start
by inspecting the average monthly returns of the momentum risk factors
from 1980 to 2014. As shown in Figure 1, we plot the mentioned average
monthly returns, per year, for WML and 52W, while also showing the
results for our proxy for excess market return.
From Figure 1, three results seem to present themselves fairly clearly:
(i) up from 2001, negative average returns in momentum risk factors seem
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FIG. 1. Average Monthly Returns (per Year) of RM − Rf , WML and 52W Risk
Factors
The figure shows average monthly returns, per year, for the excess market return
RM-Rf and the momentum risk factors WML and 52W. RM-Rf corresponds to
the value-weighted return of all CRSP firms incorporated in the US and listed
on the NYSE, NYSE MKT, and NASDAQ that have a CRSP share code of 10
or 11 minus the one-month Treasury bill rate from Ibbotson Associates. WML is
built from 6 value-weighted portfolios formed on the intersections of 2 portfolios
formed on size and 3 portfolios formed on prior t−12 to t−2 month returns, and
corresponds to the monthly average return of the two high prior return portfolios
minus the average return of the two low prior return portfolios. Data for RM−Rf
and WML was collected from Kenneth R. French’s website. 52W is a momentum
factor built according to the 52-week high strategy, using all stocks listed on
the NYSE, NYSE MKT and NASDAQ, collected from DataStream, excluding
stocks under $5 and stocks not traded during the previous month, corresponding
to the equal-weighted returns of the 30% top ranked stocks minus the equal-
weighted returns of the 30% worst ranked stocks. Sample period is January 1980
to December 2014.
somewhat more frequent and more pronounced; (ii) RM −Rf achieves, un-
surprisingly, an extreme negative return in 2008, losing an average −3.68%
per month, related to that year’s profound financial crisis; (iii) WML and
52W show very negative average returns in 2009, respectively −5.43% and
−4.18% per month, which are contemporaneous with the strong rebound
of RM −Rf up from the crash of 2008. In fact, as previously noted, strong
negative momentum performance seems to generally occur in tandem with
rapid and strong inversions in the overall market trend.
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Our results are in line with Barroso and Santa-Clara (2015) and Daniel
and Moskowitz (2016) which find that, despite high positive average re-
turns, momentum strategies can experience infrequent, but persistent and
relatively long periods of strong negative returns. Also coherently with our
results, Daniel and Moskowitz (2016) show that these extreme momentum
crashes occur following market declines, when volatility is high, and are
contemporaneous with market rebounds. The explanation is that, when
there has been a significant market decline over the formation period, the
resulting portfolio will be long on low beta and short on high beta stocks.
When the market reversal occurs, the portfolio obtains extremely negative
returns. The feature does not equally apply for winners during bull mar-
kets, justifying the asymmetry of the momentum crashes. The authors also
note that three of the worst fifteen months for momentum strategies in the
US stock market, between January 1927 and March 2013, occurred during
2009.
We suggest that momentum crashes during market reversals are also
compatible with the anchor-and-adjust bias implied by the 52-week high
strategy. Similarly, during downturns investors would be long on defensive
low beta stocks, which would remain closer to their 52-week high, and
short on the high beta stocks. Concurrently, the strategy would perform
negatively simultaneously with the market upturn. Given that 2009 seems
to have been a momentum crash year, and it appears that the extreme
negative returns influence our results for the subperiod 2001-2014, we follow
by analyzing the subperiods’ data while excluding that year. It would be
expected that, if 2009 represents in fact an outlier, or at least a particularly
strong momentum crash, the effect would reappear for the remaining years
of the subsample. In Table 8, shown below, we present the regressions for
the subperiod 2001-2014 while excluding 2009.
Succinctly, the average absolute α and adjusted R2 are, respectively,
0.24% and 0.86 for the 3-factor model, 0.15% and 0.92 for the Carhart
(1997) 4-factor model, and 0.21% and 0.91 for our own 4-factor model.
Again, we find the already familiar pattern of a reduction in the average
absolute α and increase in the adjusted R2 with the inclusion of a mo-
mentum factor, with the performance of WML far surpassing that of the
52W.
We conclude then that the exclusion of 2009 leads to results for the sub-
period 2001-2014 that are qualitatively similar to those of the whole period
and of the subperiod 1980-2000, even though the impact of the momentum
factors is not quite as dramatic as for the remaining sample periods. In
particular, and concerning 52W, the improvement in the regressions’ inter-
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TABLE 8.
Regressions for Monthly Percent Excess Returns on 25 Size-Momentum
Portfolios (Jan. 2001 - Dec. 2014 excluding 2009)
Fama-French 3-Factor Model
Rit −Rft = αi + bi(RMt −Rft) + siSMBt + hiHMLt + εit
Loser 2 3 4 Winner Loser 2 3 4 Winner
α t(α)
Small −0.49 −0.10 0.23 0.41 0.44 −1.66 −0.61 1.69 3.01 2.08
2 −0.49 0.07 0.12 0.26 0.17 −2.13 0.48 1.00 2.51 1.31
3 −0.34 0.09 0.23 0.16 0.16 −1.17 0.70 2.04 1.24 0.89
4 −0.57 0.04 0.36 0.36 0.01 −1.96 0.34 3.95 3.36 0.02
Big −0.47 −0.06 0.02 0.15 0.20 −1.45 −0.41 0.17 1.18 1.05
Average |α| 0.24 -
R2 s(e)
Small 0.79 0.91 0.93 0.90 0.86 4.05 1.74 1.39 1.59 2.23
2 0.87 0.92 0.93 0.94 0.89 3.14 1.68 1.32 1.21 1.95
3 0.80 0.93 0.93 0.89 0.83 3.73 1.53 1.28 1.52 2.33
4 0.79 0.92 0.94 0.88 0.74 3.98 1.58 1.14 1.52 2.75
Big 0.75 0.85 0.90 0.83 0.66 3.85 1.88 1.16 1.57 2.68
Average R2 0.86 -
Carhart 4-Factor Model
Rit −Rft = αi + bi(RMt −Rft) + siSMBt + hiHMLt + wiWMLt + εit
Loser 2 3 4 Winner Loser 2 3 4 Winner
α t(α)
Small −0.10 0.00 0.24 0.37 0.31 −0.42 0.03 1.79 2.53 1.34
2 −0.15 0.18 0.10 0.20 0.00 −1.19 1.47 0.89 2.06 0.03
3 0.03 0.18 0.24 0.04 −0.06 0.17 1.50 2.22 0.37 −0.54
4 −0.19 0.14 0.36 0.26 −0.25 −1.09 1.28 3.98 2.72 −1.43
Big −0.12 0.11 0.01 0.03 −0.06 −0.48 1.11 0.06 0.27 −0.51
Average |α| 0.15 -
R2 s(e)
Small 0.92 0.93 0.93 0.91 0.89 2.43 1.52 1.39 1.56 1.96
2 0.97 0.95 0.94 0.95 0.95 1.36 1.39 1.32 1.11 1.37
3 0.93 0.94 0.93 0.94 0.93 2.18 1.33 1.28 1.17 1.44
4 0.92 0.94 0.94 0.91 0.90 2.51 1.37 1.15 1.29 1.73
Big 0.89 0.92 0.90 0.90 0.88 2.57 1.34 1.16 1.19 1.56
Average R2 0.92 -
cepts is marginal. As such, though 2009 seems to have a clear effect on the
overall conclusions one may reach regarding momentum, even with its ex-
clusion the results may point to a weakening of the effect in the subperiod
2001-2014.
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TABLE 8—Continued
52W 4-Factor Model
Rit −Rft = αi + bi(RMt −Rft) + siSMBt + hiHMLt +mi52Wt + εit
Loser 2 3 4 Winner Loser 2 3 4 Winner
α t(α)
Small −0.37 −0.08 0.23 0.40 0.41 −1.39 −0.48 1.66 2.85 1.86
2 −0.39 0.09 0.10 0.24 0.14 −2.59 0.66 0.95 2.47 1.09
3 −0.22 0.11 0.22 0.12 0.10 −1.39 0.84 2.04 1.07 0.65
4 −0.45 0.06 0.36 0.33 −0.07 −1.98 0.55 3.89 3.12 −0.36
Big −0.38 −0.02 0.01 0.12 0.14 −1.14 −0.15 0.11 0.94 0.93
Average |α| 0.21 -
R2 s(e)
Small 0.90 0.92 0.93 0.91 0.87 2.76 1.68 1.39 1.58 2.14
2 0.95 0.93 0.94 0.95 0.92 1.93 1.57 1.29 1.11 1.72
3 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.90 2.26 1.45 1.28 1.22 1.81
4 0.90 0.92 0.94 0.91 0.85 2.79 1.49 1.14 1.33 2.13
Big 0.83 0.88 0.90 0.88 0.79 3.15 1.65 1.16 1.33 2.12
Average R2 0.91 -
The table shows the results from time-series regressions of the Fama and French (1993,
1996) 3-factor model, Carhart (1997) 4-factor model and 52W 4-factor model on the
monthly percent excess returns of the 25 portfolios created from 5 × 5 sorts on size and
momentum. Reported only the α, respective HAC Newey-West t-statistics, adjusted R2
and the regressions’ standard errors (for complete Tables contact the authors). Sample
period is January 2001 to December 2014 excluding 2009.
In our view, any definitive answers regarding how we consider 2009 and
the resilience of momentum will depend on the evolution to be observed
in the US stock market in the next future years. However, the findings of
Barroso and Santa-Clara (2015) and Daniel and Moskowitz (2016) as well
as our regressions’ results seem to point that at least WML momentum,
though not so clearly in the case of 52W momentum, is still a relevant
risk factor. We must also stress that seems to be plainly the case when
considering the longer and therefore more robust full sample period.
5. CONCLUSION
We propose and test a new 52W 4-factor asset pricing model with the
momentum factor built according to the 52-week high strategy of George
and Hwang (2004).
Problematically for our model, results show that a 52W momentum risk
factor for the US market, from January 1980 to December 2014, achieves
a statistically insignificant return of only 0.12% per month (the relative-
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strength WML is 0.61% per month). Even so, robustness tests show that
the performance of both momentum risk factors is very strong during 1980-
2001, especially WML, while in the period 2001-2014 the returns are neg-
ative for 52W and irrelevant for WML. We find that the results for 2001-
2014 are influenced by the momentum crash of 2009. We show, in line
with Daniel and Moskowitz (2016), that the issue is that due to the de-
pendence on the continuation of returns, momentum strategies tend to
perform very negatively following persistently bear markets, and contem-
poraneously with a quick inversion in the market trend.
The performance of all models on the 25 size-BE/ME portfolios is fairly
similar, with no clear improvement inherent to the inclusion of WML or
52W.
The need for a momentum factor becomes apparent when analyzing the
portfolios built on momentum. The 3-factor model clearly fails to capture
the anomaly and introducing a momentum risk factor greatly reduces the
average absolute α and increases the average adjusted R2. Nevertheless,
although the performance of our model does surpass the 3-factor model, it
still falls short from that of the Carhart (1997) model.
Robustness tests for the 25 size-momentum portfolios find that, for 1980-
2000, conclusions are qualitatively similar to those of the whole period. For
the subperiod 2001-2014, as the momentum effect is much more diffuse, the
performance of the models is again extremely close. However, if we exclude
the momentum crash year of 2009, the pattern somewhat reemerges, though
much weaker than for the other periods.
In conclusion, we find that the inclusion of a momentum factor at worse
does not have any effect and at best clearly improves the overall perfor-
mance of asset pricing models, with Carhart (1997)’s model fitting the data
better than the proposed 52W model.
The inclusion of a momentum risk factor on future applications of asset
pricing models depends on how one looks at the results from 2001-2014.
At least as regards WML, though less so for 52W, reports about its death
seem greatly exaggerated. We must also point out that the debate con-
cerning the nature of momentum continues very much alive, as exemplified
by Novy-Marx (2012)’s paper concerning the superior predictive power of
intermediate horizon past performance over recent past performance, and
the subsequent dispute of these conclusions in Goyal and Wahal (2015).
Additionally, Barroso and Santa-Clara (2015) and Daniel and Moskowitz
(2016) show that it is possible to improve the returns of the momentum
strategy by actively managing its risk. Consequently, we believe that much
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remains to be done regarding the construction of a momentum risk factor
that is able to capture the many different aspects of the anomaly.
Further avenues for research may also include repeating the tests for a
larger sample or after allowing for more years of data, given the influence
of 2009; conducting out-of-sample tests in other markets or geographies;
augmenting the tests with Fama and French (2015)’s 5-factor model; and
considering alternative estimating techniques.
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